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CURRENT DECISIONS
BAILMENTS-LABmiTy OF GRATUITOUS BA=.-Certain securities deposited
with the defendant bank for gratuitous safe keeping were kept with the bank's
own securities in its safe; others, for the keeping of which the bank was paid,
were kept in a safe deposit vault. The gate to the vault, but not the door of
the vault, was once left open; that night the bank was burglarized and the
securities stolen. The owner brought suit contending (i) that all the securities
should have been kept in the vault, and (2) that the burglary was proximately
caused by the bank's negligence. Held, that the bank was liable only for the
securities which it held as a bailee for hire. Harland v. Pe Ell State Bank (1922,
Wash.) 2IO Pac. 681.
The court's apparent assumption as to an inherent difference between the
respective liabilities of a gratuitous bailee and a bailee for hire seem unjustified.
(1921) 21 CoL L. REv. 38o; (I916) 16 ibid. 66; (192) 34 HARv. L. REv. 82. Courts
have held that a stricter degree of care is required where the gratuitous bailee
is a banking institution. Harper vt. Elon Banking Trust Co. (19l2) 182 N. C.
298, 1og S. E. 6; (i922) 95 CENT. L. JOUR. 57. In view of the fact that explosives
were required to force the safe deposit vault, the decision that the burglary was
proximately caused by the bank's negligence is notable, if not dubious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERcE-COMMENCEMENT OF INTER-
STATE JotRNEY.-The defendant town levied taxes on logs that were being
floated from a town in the same state to one in another state, but resting
within the defendant town because it was not practicable safely to continue the
journey at the time. The plaintiff sued to recover the amount paid as taxes.
Held, that since the logs were in the course of an interstate journey the taxa-
tion was illegal and the plaintiff could recover. Champlain Realty Co. v. Brat-
tleboro (922, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 146.
Goods are not considered as engaged in interstate commerce until actually
started on an interstate journey; transportation of goods to a depot within a
state is preliminary work. Coe v. Errol (I886) II6 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475;
Beale, The Situs of Things (i919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 525, 534; see (1923)
32 ibid. 4o6. But where the journey has been started, interruptions necessary to
such transportation do not change its character. Coe v. Errol (1882) 62 N. H.
303, 313; Prairie Oil and Gas Co. v. Ehrhardt (igio) 244 Ill. 634, 9i N. E. 68o;
see (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv. 62o. For discussion of the relation between the
state taxing power and the Federal control of interstate commerce, see Powell,
Supreme Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and State Taxing Power,
z91o-19i4 (i922) 22 COL. L. REv. 133; Powell, The Supreme Court's Adjudica-
tLion, of Constitutional Issues in I921-1922 (1922) 21 MicH. L. REv. 174, 195.
CoutnTs-CoURT OF CLMMS-JuRISrcrIoN OF APPL FR Mo ExEcuTIvE's DEcI-
sioN.-Section 15 of the Act of May 22, 1917 (40 Stat. at L. 84) provided that
certain members of the Coast Guard should receive the same rates of pay as
those prescribed for corresponding grades and ratings in the Navy. The Sec-
retary of the Navy issued an order not in harmony with this statute. The plain-
tiff sued for the difference between pay received by him as yeoman in the Coast
Guard and that which a chief yeoman in the Navy would have received for a like
period, the duties and qualifications of these positions being similar. Held, that
the administrative order of the Secretary of the Navy was not conclusive and that
the plaintiff could recover. United States v. Allen (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 369.
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Where the facts are undisputed the Court of Claims generally has jurisdiction
of questions of law. United States v. Laughlin (1919) 249 U. S. 440, 39 Sup.
Ct 340. However, where exclusive and final jurisdiction had been conferred
upon a Department, the Court of Claims has no power to review. United States
v. Babcock (1919) 250 U. S. 328, 39 Sup. Ct. 464. See in general Crane, .uris-
diction of the United States Court of Claims (192o) 34 HARv. L. REv. 161.
CRIMINAL LAw-DISTINCTION BETWEEN CONDITIONAL PARDON AND PARoMin-
The plaintiff, who was under a sentence which would have expired April 5,
1922, was paroled during good behavior. Subsequent to that date, the plaintiff
was recommitted to serve out his sentence. He applied for a writ of habeas
corpus against the superintendent of the state penitentiary. Held, (one judge
dissenting) that the confinement was illegal. Crooks v. Sanders (1922, S. C.)
ii5 S. E. 76o.
The ancient power of pardon is a "sacred" and difficult function. Goodrich,
The Use and Abuse of the Power to Pardon (192o) ii Jou. CR. L. 334 It
being strictly executive, neither the legislature nor the courts may interfere with
its exercise. (1921) 21 COL. L. Rxv. 289; NoTs (IgI8) 2 MINN. L. REv. 381.
It includes the power of conditional pardon and parole, between which courts
often fail to distinguish. In re Convicts (190) 73 Vt. 414, 51 Atl. IO; State v.
Yates (1922) 183 N. C. 753, ini S. E. 337; In re Prout (igo6) 12 Idaho, 494,
86 Pac. 275. It is well settled that a pardon may be revoked upon a breach of
condition even after the sentence would have expired. State v. Horne (igo6)
52 Fla. 125, 42 So. 388; (199o) 38 NAT. CORP. REP. 873. Many courts apply the
same rule to parole. Commonwealth v. Minor (1922) 195 Ky. 103, 241 S. W.
856; Ex parte Ridley (1910) 3 Okla. Cr. 350, io6 Pac. 549; Fuller v. State (1898)
122 Ala. 32, 26 So. 146. But other jurisdictions, in accord with the principal
case, reach the contrary result, namely, that a parole does not suspend a sentence.
Anderson v. Williams (1922, C. C. A. 8th) 279 Fed. 822; In re Prout (19o6)
12 Idaho, 494, 86 Pac. 275. This latter view seems sound and is in harmony
with the general rule that a parole, unlike a conditional pardon, may be revoked
summarily and without a hearing. Ex parte Sparks (1921) 9o Tex. Cr. Igo, 234
S. W. 393; (19o8) 67 CENT. L. JouR. 188; (io5) 119 LAw TIMES 433.
DIvoRCE-HOMEsTEAD PROPERTY SUBJECT TO LIEN FOR ALIMONY.-In a decree
of absolute divorce the award of alimony was made a lien "upon any and all real
estate" of the husband.. On the husband's death, his heirs brought action to quiet
title in premises occupied for many years by the decedent as a homestead. Held,
that the homestead was subject to the satisfaction of the judgment for alimony.
Luedecke v. Luedecke (1923, Iowa) 192 N. W. 515.
The homestead exemption is for the benefit of the entire family as well as the
husband. Freeman, Law of Executions (2d ed. 1888) sec. 240; see Dieter v.
Fraire (igio) 2o N. D. 484, 489, 128 N. W. 684, 686; Daniels v. Morris (188o)
54 Iowa, 369, 371, 6 N. W. 532, 533. In accordance with this policy a divorce
decree may create a lien upon the homestead. Haven v. Trammell (1920) 79
Okla. 309, 193 Pac. 631; Praaman v. Franuxn (1902) 64 Neb. 472, 9o N. W. 245;
see 102 .Am. St Rep. 7o9, note.
MASTER AND SERVANT-DuRATION OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT.-The defendant
engaged the plaintiff at a fixed annual salary, without any mention of the duration
of the service. The plaintiff having been discharged after several months,
claimed damages on the ground that the contract was for a year. Held, that the
plaintiff could recover. Willis v. Wyllys Corporation (1922, N. J. L.) 119 AtI. 24.
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The English rule that, in the absence of express stipulation, 
a hiring is for one
year-, was followed. Labatt, Right to Terminate a Hiring 
(1898) 34 CAN. L.
JoUP. 587. The majority of courts in this country, 
however, hold such contracts
terminable at will. (1915) 81 CENT. L. JouR. 441; (i9o8) 66 ibid. 
156; I Willis-
ton, Contracts (Ig2o) 6o.
TRuSTs-REoVAL OF TRUsTEE-SUSPENSION PENDENTE 
LITE.-The plaintiff
brought an action as trustee for an accounting and approval 
of his acts. On
motion for his removal, it was proved that he had received 
secret profits from
dealings with the trust estate. The trial judge removed 
him from the trusteeship.
Held, (two judges dissenting) that the removal was proper. 
Gould v. Gould
(1922, N. Y.) 203 App. Div. 8o7.
Where the removal of the trustee involves time in investigation 
and danger to
the estate, a suspension alone seems sufficient. Although 
the majority of the
court deny the power to suspend, it seems that such a 
power is included in the
power to appoint a receiver pendente lite when the trust 
estate is in danger from
the active misconduct of the trustee. See 2 Perry, Trusts 
and Trustees (6th
ed. 191n) sec. 818; 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed. 1919) 
secs. 1334,
151o; Wilmer v. Airline Ry. (1875, C. C. N. D. Ga.) 
Fed. Cas. No. 17,775;
North Carolina Ry. v. Wilson (1879) 81 N. C. 223.
TRUSTS-SPEcIFIC DEPOSIT To MEET INTEREST 
PAYMENTS.-A public utility
company opened a special account "to cover interest 
coupons due" upon its
bonds. The bank became insolvent. The company and 
the holders of the
coupons sought to impress a trust upon the fund. Held, (two 
judges dissenting)
that there was no trust.. Fralick v. Coeur d'Alene Bank and 
Trust Co. (1922,
Idaho) 21o Pac. 586.
The instant case is sound in following the doctrine that a depositor 
claiming
a preference must clearly establish a trust. Hitt Fireworks Co. v. 
Scandinzan
Bank (1922, Wash.) 209 Pac. 68o; Morse, Banks and Banking 
(5th ed. 1917)
sec. 568(a); NoTEs (1922) 6 MINN. L. REv- 3o6; (1923) 32 YALE LAv JOURNAL,
410; cf. (1923) 7 MINN. L. REv. 165.
WIus-CoNTINGENT WnLs-RuLE OF CoNsTucrio.-An instrument 
offered
for probate as a will was, under its terms, to be operative "if any 
thing happen
to me in Constantinople or in ocean." The maker went to Constantinople,
returned to Rochester, and resided there until his death sixteen 
years later.
Held, that the instrument should be denied probate. In re Poonariales 
Will
(1922, N. Y.) 137 N. E. 6o6.
Due to the strong tendency of the courts to favor testacy, a will, whenever
possible, is construed as unconditional. Eaton v. Brown (1904) 193 U. S. 411,
24 Sup. Ct. 487; Walker v. Hibbard (1919) 185 Ky. 795, 215 
S. W. 80o;
Gardner, Wills (1903) 70. The determining question is, does the contingency
show the inducing cause for making the will, or the condition on which 
it is
to operate? Skipwith v. Cabell (187o, Va.) ig Gratt. 758; In re Tinsley's 
Will
(1919) 187 Iowa, 23, 174 N. W. . The instant case is one of comparatively
few holding a will contingent.
